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ARTICLES
ON A COLLISION COURSE: PURE
PROPENSITY EVIDENCE AND
DUE PROCESS IN ALASKA
DREW D. DROPKIN*
JAMES H. MCCOMAS**
This Article examines the four propensity evidence provisions embodied in Alaska Rule of Evidence 404 and the
threat they pose to the constitutional due process rights of
defendants. Rule 404 permits the state, in certain criminal
cases, to introduce evidence of a defendant’s criminal propensity to show that the defendant acted in accordance with
this propensity. The authors argue that this contravenes a
deeply rooted principle of American criminal justice disallowing such propensity evidence, and they are critical of
Alaska Court of Appeals decisions upholding the constitutionality of three of the propensity evidence exceptions. The
Article analyzes the court’s reliance on judicial balancing as
a safeguard against due process threats and discusses why
this approach to propensity evidence is flawed.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Alaska legislature is treading on thin ice, and the Alaska
Court of Appeals has joined its legislators in the middle of a perilous constitutional pond. Seven years ago, the Alaska legislature
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initiated a concerted attack upon the well-accepted principle that
“other-misconduct” evidence,1 which is offered to prove an ac2
cused’s bad character or criminal propensity, is inadmissible in a
3
criminal trial. By enacting the propensity provisions embodied in
4
Alaska Rule of Evidence (“ARE”) 404, the legislature has repudiated this deeply-rooted principle of American criminal justice and
permitted the state to introduce evidence of a defendant’s criminal
5
propensity in many criminal cases. Three of the four “pure” propensity provisions have survived due process challenges in the
6
Alaska Court of Appeals since 1997, and the court of appeals has
yet to provide a precedential opinion evaluating the constitutional7
ity of the fourth. The Alaska Supreme Court has not yet ruled on
8
the constitutionality of the propensity provisions. However, the
court made clear that it incorporated the provisions into ARE 404
9
solely because legislation required it.
1. “Other-misconduct” evidence refers to evidence of an accused’s other
crimes, wrongful acts, and/or bad character.
2. “Criminal propensity” refers to use of evidence of the defendant’s character or prior acts to persuade the jury that the defendant acted in conformity with
his character or disposition during the alleged incident. James S. Liebman, Proposed Evidence Rules 413 to 415—Some Problems and Recommendations, 20 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 753, 754 (1995).
3. These “propensity provisions” include four different categories of evidence deemed admissible by the Alaska legislature. The legislature has specifically approved the use of such evidence to persuade the jury that the defendant
acted in conformity with this propensity during the alleged event. See infra Part
II. By contrast, evidence of prior acts has routinely been admitted for “nonpropensity purposes”—establishing intent, motive, opportunity, knowledge and
plan. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
4. See ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a)(2), 404(b)(2), 404(b)(3), and 404(b)(4).
5. Namely, this propensity evidence is used in cases of aggressive behavior,
see ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a)(2), child abuse, see id. 404(b)(2), sexual assault, see
id. 404(b)(3), and domestic violence, see id. 404(b)(4). For a detailed discussion of
each exception, see infra Part II.
6. See infra notes 152-168 and accompanying text. Federal circuit courts
have similarly upheld the sexual assault exceptions established in Federal Rules of
Evidence 413-415 on the same basis. The United States Supreme Court has not
addressed the pure propensity issue.
7. The court of appeals has issued non-binding memorandum opinions upholding the constitutionality of the fourth exception on substantially the same
grounds as the prior three. See infra note 151.
8. In Hess v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the accused’s conviction because of improper application of ARE 404(b)(3). The court did not address the constitutionality of the propensity exception. 20 P.3d 1121 (Alaska
2001).
9. See infra note 53.
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Alaska’s propensity provisions vest prosecutors with virtually
unfettered power to impugn the character of a criminal defendant
in cases of alleged aggressive behavior, child abuse, sexual assault,
10
and domestic violence. Subject only to minimal limitations, these
exceptions openly invite the state to tread on the constitutional due
process rights of defendants in contravention of several bedrock
principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence. The Alaska Court of
Appeals’ inability to appreciate the threat that pure propensity
evidence poses to due process bestows upon the Alaska Supreme
Court the responsibility to declare the ARE 404 exceptions unconstitutional. This Article suggests that the supreme court will not
hesitate to do so.
The Article proceeds in six parts. Part II introduces Alaska’s
four pure propensity exceptions—the first aggressor exception, the
child abuse exception, the sexual assault exception, and the domestic violence exception—and places these exceptions in the context
of the evidence rules of other states and the federal courts. Part III
traces the historical treatment of propensity evidence and identifies
three fundamental principles of federal due process—the presumption of innocence, the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of
proof, and the prohibition against status crimes—that are endangered by the admission of propensity evidence. Relying on the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Dowling v. United
11
States, this section also identifies three procedural safeguards that
protect a defendant’s federal due process rights when othermisconduct evidence is admitted for non-propensity purposes. Part
IV analyzes the Alaska Court of Appeals’ approach to Alaska’s
pure propensity provisions and highlights the court’s heavy reliance
upon one procedural safeguard, judicial balancing under ARE 403,
to protect the defendant’s due process rights. Part V isolates the
major flaw in the intermediate court’s reasoning. Although the
court relies entirely on the “protection” afforded by judicial balancing under ARE 403, this safeguard is meaningless where othermisconduct evidence is employed for a pure propensity purpose.
The propensity provisions disable meaningful ARE 403 balancing
by redefining unfair prejudice as legitimate “probative” value. By
putting both interests on the same side of the scale, nothing is left
to balance. Recognizing that propensity provisions pose a clear
10. These limitations may establish the court’s procedure for considering the
admission of such evidence, see ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a)(2), the similarity requirements for such evidence, see id. 404(b)(2), or the fact that the admission of
the evidence is contingent on the nature of the accused’s defense, see id. 404(b)(3).
See infra notes 26, 41-42, 49-50 and accompanying text.
11. 493 U.S. 342 (1990).

DROPKIN_FMT.DOC

180

11/01/01 3:14 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[18:2

threat to federal due process, Part VI suggests that the admission
of such evidence for a propensity purpose independently violates
the requirements of due process in Alaska.
In finding Alaska’s propensity provisions unconstitutional, this
Article does not suggest that the traditional use of othermisconduct evidence for non-propensity purposes is unconstitutional. Furthermore, as Part VII suggests, the unconstitutionality
of these exceptions will not necessarily bar much of the evidence
from being introduced at trial. On the contrary, some such evidence will be admitted under ARE 404(b)(1) for non-propensity
purposes. In admitting this evidence for non-propensity purposes,
Alaska courts will furnish defendants with the benefits of traditional procedural safeguards and will strike the appropriate balance between the permissible introduction of the evidence and the
constitutional requirements of due process.
II. ALASKA RULE OF EVIDENCE 404 AND THE
FOUR PROPENSITY EXCEPTIONS
12
ARE 404 addresses the admissibility of evidence of a per13
The Alaska Evidence
son’s character or a trait of character.
Rules generally track the structure of the Federal Rules of Evi14
dence (“FRE”). ARE 404, like its federal counterpart, dedicates
15
a section to “Character Evidence Generally” and a section to
16
“Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.” Alaska’s propensity exceptions
are ensconced in these two sections of ARE 404.
ARE 404(a) generally prohibits the admission of evidence of
an individual’s character or a trait of that individual’s character for
the purpose of proving that the individual acted in conformity with

12. ALASKA R. EVID. 404.
13. In ARE 404, the treatment of character evidence is not limited solely to
the character of the criminally accused; the scope of ARE 404 also includes the
admission of character evidence with respect to the victim and witnesses. ALASKA
R. EVID. 404(a). Although the character evidence rule is more often invoked in
criminal trials, ARE 404 also applies to civil cases. See Coulson v. Marsh &
McLennan, Inc., 973 P.2d 1142, 1145, 1150 (Alaska 1999) (in a civil case alleging
invasion of privacy, conversion, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional
distress, affirming a lower court’s decision to exclude evidence of a defendant’s
prior act of copying confidential client lists on the grounds that it was propensity
evidence prohibited under ARE 404). For the purposes of this examination, we
discuss the implications of ARE 404 only in criminal cases because of the significant due process rights extended to the criminally accused.
14. See FED. R. EVID. 404.
15. Compare FED. R. EVID. 404(a) with ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a).
16. Compare FED. R. EVID. 404(b) with ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b).
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such character during the alleged crime.17 However, the rule em18
bodies three exceptions that have been widely accepted in other
19
jurisdictions : (1) evidence of the defendant’s character may be
admitted, by the defendant and the prosecution, if the evidence is
20
initially offered by the defendant ; (2) evidence of the victim’s
character may be admitted, by the defendant and the prosecution,
21
if the evidence is initially offered by the defendant ; and (3) evidence of the character of a witness may be admitted as governed by
22
Alaska Rules of Evidence 607-609.
At common law, the defendant in an assault or homicide case
was entitled to introduce evidence of the victim’s violent character,
which served as circumstantial evidence that the victim may have
23
been the initial aggressor during the incident. The government
was subsequently entitled to rebut the defendant’s evidence by introducing contrary evidence evincing the peacefulness of the vic24
tim. If the defendant introduced evidence of the victim’s violent
character, the prosecution was not permitted to introduce evidence
of the defendant’s violent character. Conceptually, the character of

17. ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a) (“Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion . . . .”).
18. Id. 404(a)(1)-(a)(3).
19. The Official Commentary to ARE 404 notes that:
[i]n most jurisdictions today, the circumstantial use of character is rejected
but with important exceptions: (1) an accused may introduce relevant
evidence of good character (often misleadingly described as “putting his
character in issue”), in which event the prosecution may rebut with evidence of bad character; (2) an accused may introduce relevant evidence
of the character of the victim, as in support of a claim of self-defense to a
charge of homicide or consent in a case of rape, and the prosecution may
introduce similar evidence in rebuttal of the character evidence, or, in a
homicide case, to rebut a claim that [the] deceased was the first aggressor, and (3) the character of a witness may be gone into as bearing on his
credibility.
ALASKA R. EVID. 404 cmt. a.
20. Id. 404(a)(1) (“Character of Accused. Evidence of a relevant trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same . . . .”).
21. Id. 404(a)(2) (“Character of Victim. Evidence of a relevant trait of character of a victim of a crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same . . . .”).
22. Id. 404(a)(3) (“Character of a Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.”); cf. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1)-(a)(3).
23. Allen v. State, 945 P.2d 1233, 1235 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
24. Id. (citing JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 193, at
820-21 & n.1 (4th ed. 1992)).
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the victim and the character of the defendant were not interrelated.25
Alaska, however, has broadened the common law admission
of character evidence in its ARE 404(a)(2) first aggressor excep26
tion. In 1980, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded in Keith v.
27
State, in accordance with the common law rule, that the character
of the victim and the character of the defendant were not interrelated, and therefore the prosecution could not introduce evidence
of the defendant’s character after the defendant offers evidence of
28
the aggressive propensity of the victim. The legislature purported
29
to vitiate the Keith holding by amending ARE 404(a)(2) in 1994.
Under the amended rule, when the defendant asserts that the victim was the first aggressor, for example by claiming self-defense,
the state may introduce evidence of the defendant’s violent disposi30
tion in addition to evidence of the victim’s peacefulness.
25. See Allen, 945 P.2d at 1235-36.
26. The first aggressor exception authorizes the introduction of the following
evidence:
Character of Victim. . . . evidence of a relevant character trait of an accused or of a character trait for peacefulness of the victim offered by the
prosecution in a case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor, subject to the following procedure:
(i) When a party seeks to admit the evidence for any purpose, the party
must apply for an order of the court at any time before or during the trial
or preliminary hearing.
(ii) The court shall conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury in
order to determine whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the victim. The hearing may be
conducted in camera where there is a danger of unwarranted invasion of
the privacy of the victim.
(iii) The court shall order what evidence may be introduced and the nature of the questions which shall be permitted.
(iv) In prosecutions for the crime of sexual assault in any degree and attempt to commit sexual assault in any degree, evidence of the victim’s
conduct occurring more than one year before the date of the offense
charged is presumed to be inadmissible under this rule, in the absence of
a persuasive showing to the contrary.
ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
27. 612 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1980).
28. See id. at 984 (rejecting the notion that “proof of the character of the victim and the accused [were] interrelated”).
29. See Act of June 17, 1994, ch. 116, sec. 2, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws.
30. The amended ARE 404(a)(2) deems the following evidence admissible,
with the added language in italics:
Character of Victim. Evidence of a relevant trait of character of a victim
of crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same,
or evidence of a relevant character trait of an accused or of a character
trait for peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a case to
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Alaska’s first aggressor exception deviates from the first aggressor exception in the Federal Rules of Evidence in one critical
respect. Under FRE 404(a)(2), if the accused asserts that the victim was the first aggressor (i.e., the accused claims self-defense),
the prosecution may offer evidence of the victim’s peacefulness
even if the accused did not offer evidence of the victim’s character
31
when the self-defense claim was made. This FRE first aggressor
32
exception is limited to homicide cases only. More importantly,
FRE 404(a)(2) does not authorize the prosecution to present evidence of the accused’s character when a self-defense claim is asserted. FRE 404(a)(1) governs the introduction of character evidence of the accused, and under that rule, the prosecution may
introduce evidence of a pertinent character trait of the accused if
the accused offers evidence of the same character trait in the vic33
tim. Because FRE 404(a)(2)’s first aggressor exception authorizes
the prosecution to offer evidence of the victim’s character in a selfdefense homicide case, FRE 404(a)(1) does not consequently permit the prosecution to present character evidence of the accused in
a self-defense case as well. The admissibility of character evidence
of the accused remains within the control of the accused—the accused must offer character evidence of the victim pursuant to FRE
404(a)(2) before the prosecution will be permitted to offer evidence of the same character trait of the accused. Therefore, the
accused can assert self-defense without presenting character evidence of the victim, and in this situation, the prosecution would be
permitted to introduce evidence of the victim’s character under the

rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor, subject to the following procedure . . . .
ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
31. FRE 404(a)(2) states:
Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a
character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first
aggressor.
FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
32. See id.
33. FRE 404(a)(1) states:
Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the
prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by an accused and admitted under Rule
404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by
the prosecution.
FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
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first aggressor exception but would not be authorized to offer evidence of the character of the accused.
The Alaska first aggressor exception undermines the sensible
framework adopted by the Federal Rules. Under ARE 404(a)(2),
the prosecution may present evidence of a character trait of the accused in any case where the accused claims self-defense subject to
34
the procedure prescribed in the rule. In essence, the Alaska rule
eviscerates the prohibition against character evidence in all cases
where self-defense (one of the most prevalent criminal defenses) is
asserted by the accused. Although the accused can preclude the
admission of character evidence about himself by refusing to claim
self-defense, this decision is substantially different from the decision made by the accused in federal courts. In federal courts, the
accused must forego the presentation of character evidence of the
victim to avoid the introduction of character evidence about himself; in Alaska courts, the accused must forego one of the most frequently invoked defenses in criminal proceedings to avoid the introduction of character evidence about himself. Alaska’s first
aggressor exception expands tremendously the circumstances under which the prosecution may present character evidence of the
accused. Furthermore, the troubling dilemma that the accused face
under ARE 404(a)(2)—which requires them to authorize the introduction of character evidence as the penalty for invoking selfdefense—may present additional significant due process concerns
that are beyond the scope of this Article.
ARE 404(a) is augmented by ARE 404(b), which generally
prohibits the introduction of evidence of a defendant’s prior
crimes, wrongs, or acts to demonstrate that the defendant acted in
35
conformity with his prior acts at the time of the alleged crime.
The “other crimes” prohibition is not absolute. Pursuant to ARE
404(b)(1), the prosecution is permitted to introduce evidence of a
defendant’s other crimes, wrongs, or acts if the evidence is em36
ployed for a non-propensity purpose. Non-propensity purposes

34. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
35. Id. 404(b)(1) (“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
if the sole purpose for offering the evidence is to prove the character of a person
in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.”).
36. Id. 404(b)(1) (“[Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts] is, however,
admissible for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.”); see supra note 3 (discussing the distinction between “propensity evidence” and evidence used for “non-propensity” purposes). For a discussion of the
admission of “other crimes” evidence for “non-propensity” purposes, including a
constitutional evaluation, see infra Part III.
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expressly include proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.37 Furthermore, this list of “non-propensity purposes” is not intended to
38
be exclusive —the express language of ARE 404(b)(1) also permits the introduction of such evidence “for other purposes,” so
39
long as the evidence is not presented for a “propensity” purpose.
By and large, courts and commentators agree that such an admission of other-misconduct evidence for a non-propensity purpose
40
does not automatically violate due process.
While the “non-propensity purpose” doctrine has been widely
accepted by other jurisdictions, the Alaska legislature has blazed a
new evidentiary trail by approving three additional othermisconduct provisions. Specifically, the legislature has established
41
42
a child abuse exception, a sexual assault exception, and a domes43
tic violence exception. Each exception, by its terms, permits the

37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Petersen v. State, 930 P.2d 414, 432 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996) (permitting admission of propensity evidence to demonstrate the relationship between
the victim and the accused, even though this purpose is not expressly authorized
by ARE 404(b)(1)).
39. See supra note 36 (text of ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(1)).
40. See, e.g., Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990); Allen v. State, 945
P.2d 1233 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
41. Contrary to the general prohibition against evidence of the defendant’s
other crimes, wrongs, or acts, ARE 404(b)(2) states:
In a prosecution for a crime involving a physical or sexual assault or
abuse of a minor, evidence of other acts by the defendant toward the
same or another child is admissible if admission of the evidence is not
precluded by another rule of evidence and if the prior offenses
(i) occurred within the 10 years preceding the date of the offense
charged;
(ii) are similar to the offense charged; and
(iii) were committed upon persons similar to the prosecuting witness.
ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(2).
42. ARE 404(b)(3) states:
In a prosecution for a crime of sexual assault in any degree, evidence of
other sexual assaults or attempted sexual assaults by the defendant
against the same or another person is admissible if the defendant relies
on a defense of consent. In a prosecution for a crime of attempt to
commit sexual assault in any degree, evidence of other sexual assaults or
attempted sexual assaults by the defendant against the same or another
person is admissible.
ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(3).
43. ARE 404(b)(4) states:
In a prosecution for a crime involving domestic violence or of interfering
with a report of a crime involving domestic violence, evidence of other
crimes involving domestic violence by the defendant against the same or
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prosecution to admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for
the express purpose of persuading jurors that the defendant acted
44
in accordance with his prior acts during the alleged incident.
In 1994, the Alaska legislature amended ARE 404(b) to in45
clude exceptions in cases of child abuse and sexual assault. Six
46
years earlier, in Velez v. State, the Alaska Court of Appeals concluded that the limitations embodied in ARE 404(b)(1) precluded
the state from offering such evidence in sexual assault cases for the
sole purpose of establishing the defendant’s propensity to commit
47
sexual assault. In response to Velez and other cases construing
ARE 404(b)(1) to preclude the admission of pure propensity evidence, the legislature added the child abuse and sexual assault ex48
ceptions to ARE 404(b).
These two exceptions were incorporated into the Alaska Rules
of Evidence at the same time. Practically speaking, however, their
similarity ends there. The child abuse exception in ARE 404(b)(2)
sets forth three standards that evidence of prior child abuse must
satisfy to be admissible: the act must have occurred within ten
years of the offense charged, it must be similar to the offense
charged, and it must have been committed upon a person who is
49
similar to the prosecuting witness. In contrast, sexual assault evidence under 404(b)(3) need not meet any standards of similarity
under the text of the rule. If the defendant is charged with attempted sexual assault, all evidence of prior sexual assaults or attempted sexual assaults is admissible. If the defendant is charged
with sexual assault (as opposed to attempted sexual assault), evidence of prior sexual assaults is admissible only if the defendant
50
relies on a defense of consent.
Three years later, in 1997, the legislature amended the Alaska
Rules of Evidence to include a fourth exception in cases of domes-

another person or of interfering with a report of a crime of domestic
abuse is admissible.
ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(4).
44. ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(2)-(4).
45. Act of June 17, 1994, ch. 116, sec. 1, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws. See supra
notes 41-42 for the text of these exceptions. ARE 404(b)(3) was further amended
in Act of June 12, 1998, ch. 86, sec. 18, 1998 Alaska Sess. Laws (making the presentation of evidence of other sexual assaults admissible only if the defendant relies on a defense of consent).
46. 762 P.2d 1297 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
47. Id. at 1304.
48. Wardlow v. State, 2 P.3d 1238, 1246 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
49. See supra note 41 (text of ARE 404(b)(2)).
50. See supra note 42 (text of ARE 404(b)(3)).
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tic violence.51 Pursuant to ARE 404(b)(4), domestic violence propensity evidence may be admitted in any prosecution of a domestic
violence crime or any prosecution for interfering with a domestic
52
violence report. The use of such evidence is not proscribed by
similarity standards (unlike the child abuse exception), and its use
is not contingent upon the defenses presented by the accused at
trial (unlike the sexual assault exception in non-attempt cases).
Although the four propensity exceptions were validly enacted
by the Alaska state legislature, their enactment does not endow
these provisions with the imprimatur of constitutionality. When
the Alaska Supreme Court was presented with the child abuse,
sexual assault, and domestic violence exceptions, the court gave
special notice that the “sole reason” that the rules were adopted
53
was that the “legislature [had] mandated the amendment.” Because these exceptions authorize state prosecutors to employ pure
propensity evidence in a manner inconsistent with centuries of
criminal law tradition and the consistent rulings of the Alaska Supreme Court, the suspect constitutionality of these exceptions is
worthy of extended consideration.
If these propensity provisions violate the constitutional guarantee of due process, they cannot govern the admissibility of evidence in criminal trials. Practically speaking, the admission of pure
propensity evidence pursuant to Alaska’s propensity exceptions
could violate due process on two levels. First, the admission of
pure propensity evidence might be unconstitutional as a violation
54
of a defendant’s federal due process rights. Second, even if the
admission of pure propensity evidence is not a violation of federal
due process, it may nonetheless violate the fundamental due proc55
ess guarantee of the Alaska Constitution. Each of these due process issues will be examined in turn.

51. Act of June 3, 1997, ch. 63, sec. 22, 1997 Alaska Sess. Laws (amending
ARE 404(b)).
52. See supra note 43 (text of ARE 404(b)(4)).
53. ALASKA R. EVID. 404, Notes to Supreme Court Orders 1293, 1339.
54. “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V; “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” id. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
55. “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. The right of all persons to fair and just treatment in the course of legislative and executive investigations shall not be infringed.” ALASKA CONST. art.
I, § 7.

DROPKIN_FMT.DOC

188

11/01/01 3:14 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[18:2

III. PURE PROPENSITY EVIDENCE THREATENS
FEDERAL DUE PROCESS
A. The Historical Aversion to Pure Propensity Evidence
The prohibition against the introduction of other crimes/bad
acts/bad character evidence for the purpose of establishing conformity with the charged conduct can be traced back to the era be56
fore the independence of the nation. In England, courts prohibited the introduction of such evidence nearly a century before the
57
American revolution. In 1692, for instance, an English court rejected the admission of pure propensity evidence in Harrison’s
58
Trial. The prosecution intended to present other-misconduct evidence during the murder case. Lord Chief Justice Holt excluded
the evidence, proclaiming, “Hold, what are you doing now? Are
you going to arraign his whole life? Away, away, that ought not to
59
be; that is nothing to the matter.” American jurists have commonly traced the exclusion of pure propensity evidence to
Harrison’s Trial and England’s Glorious Revolution of the late
60
seventeenth century. Moreover, the prohibition against the admission of pure propensity evidence antedates the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard by more than a century.
The criminal propensity prohibition made the transatlantic
voyage to the New World and has long since been a principle of the

56. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 448 n.1 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The common law has long deemed it unfair to argue that, because a person
has committed a crime in the past, he is more likely to have committed a similar,
more recent crime.”).
57. In Hampden’s Trial, for instance, the English court observed that “a person was indicted of forgery, [but] we would not let them give evidence of any
other forgeries, but that for which he was indicted.” 9 How. St. Tr. 1053, 1103
(K.B. 1684); see also United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 881 (10th Cir. 1998)
(“The ban on propensity evidence dates back to English cases of the seventeenth
century.”).
58. 12 How. St. Tr. 834 (Old Bailey 1692).
59. Id. at 864.
60. See Anderson v. State, 549 So. 2d 807, 813 n.8 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989)
(Cowart, J., dissenting) (referencing Harrison’s Trial and Lord Chief Justice
Holt’s remarks to illustrate that the exclusion of propensity evidence is a principle
at common law); State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 n.1 (Minn. 1965) (noting
that the exclusion of propensity evidence was first applied in England after 1680
and offering Harrison’s Trial as an example of its emergence).
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American criminal system.61 Before the American Revolution, the
exclusion of pure propensity evidence was embraced by colonial
62
courts. In Rex v. Doaks, for example, the state attempted to offer
evidence of the defendant’s prior acts of lasciviousness to bolster
63
its allegations that the defendant was operating a bawdy house.
This evidence was excluded by Massachusetts’ highest court.64
Such colonial courts ushered the common law prohibition of pure
propensity evidence into American jurisprudence, and the influence of this principle became apparent in the late nineteenth century when the United States Supreme Court first prohibited the
65
admission of prior crimes evidence in Boyd v. United States.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the prohibition
against the use of pure propensity evidence to establish guilt was a
66
settled principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence. The United
States Supreme Court has condemned the use of such evidence in
criminal proceedings for decades. In Michelson v. United States, for
example, the Court wrote:
The state may not show defendant’s prior trouble with the law,
specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even
though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not
rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said
to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as
to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair
opportunity to defend against a particular charge. The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends

61. See Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, “Are You Going to Arraign
His Whole Life?”: How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates The Due Process
Clause, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 13 (1996).
62. Quincy’s Mass. 90 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1763).
63. Id. at 90-91.
64. Id. at 91.
65. 142 U.S. 450, 458 (1892) (“Proof of [prior robberies admitted at trial] only
tended to prejudice the defendants with the jurors, to draw their minds away from
the real issue, and to produce the impression that they were wretches whose lives
were of no value to the community, and who were not entitled to the full benefit
of the rules prescribed by law.”).
66. People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 293-94 (N.Y. 1901) (“This [no propensity
evidence] rule, so universally recognized and so firmly established in all Englishspeaking lands, is rooted in that jealous regard for the liberty of the individual
which has distinguished our jurisprudence from all others, at least from the birth
of Magna Charta. It is the product of that same humane and enlightened public
spirit which, speaking through our common law, has decreed that every person
charged with the commission of a crime shall be protected by the presumption of
innocence until he has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
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to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue preju67
dice.

Almost fifty years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its condemnation of proving “a defendant’s . . . bad character and taking that
as raising the odds that he did the later bad act now charged (or,
worse, calling for preventive conviction even if he should happen to
68
be innocent momentarily),” calling the use of such tactics an “‘im69
proper’ basis for conviction.”
B. The Threat to Federal Due Process
Federal due process is intended to safeguard those “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and
70
political institutions.” Accordingly, federal due process requires
states to respect and comply with the community’s sense of fair
71
play and decency, and it is violated when a state offends a principle of justice that is “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
72
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” This focus on history, which was first announced by the United States Supreme
73
74
Court in 1856 and was further articulated by the Court in 1884,
still governs the due process inquiry today. The Court has reaf75
firmed this historical approach on numerous occasions, emphasizing that courts should primarily rely upon historical practice to
evaluate whether a principle has enjoyed “uniform and continuing
76
acceptance.”
The historical evidence supporting exclusion of pure propensity evidence is compelling. From the days of England’s Glorious
Revolution until the present day, courts have demonstrated a
steadfast commitment to the principle that pure propensity evidence should not be admitted, fearing that juries will infer present
guilt from previous conduct. Beginning in the late 1600s, courts in

67. 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
68. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180-81 (1997).
69. Id. at 182.
70. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935).
71. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
72. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977) (quoting Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952);
Synder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
73. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 276-77 (1856).
74. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528 (1884).
75. See, e.g., Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 353 (1990); Montana v.
Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43, 48 (1996).
76. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 43, 48.
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England—and eventually pre-colonial America as well—recognized the threat to fairness created by pure propensity evidence
and sought to exclude it from criminal trials. The principle has
enjoyed longstanding status as a fundamental principle of American criminal justice.
More importantly, as the United States Supreme Court has
recognized, the admission of pure propensity evidence directly undermines three specific principles of federal due process: (1) the
presumption of innocence; (2) the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard of proof; and (3) the principle that cases, not people, are
placed on trial. Chief Justice Warren, in his memorable dissent in
77
Spencer v. Texas, provided the blueprint for this contemporary
understanding of the interplay between due process and the admission of pure propensity evidence.
In Spencer, the United States Supreme Court was called upon
to assess the constitutionality of a Texas procedure for enforcing its
78
habitual criminal statutes. Under these statutes, the state could
allege prior offenses in indictments and could introduce proof of
past convictions so long as the court charged the jury that such information should not be taken into account while determining the
79
guilt or innocence of the defendant. In a 5-4 decision, the Court
concluded that due process did not require the state to bifurcate its
trial in a manner that would allow the jury to determine guilt as an
initial matter and subsequently determine the punishment in light
of the defendant’s prior convictions and the standards of Texas’s
80
Notably, the majority clearly grounded its
recidivism statute.
ruling in the Court’s extremely deferential approach to a state’s
81
criminal procedure. Although the Court announced that Texas’s
admission of prior convictions at trial did not violate the Constitu82
tion, the majority emphasized that the evidence probably would
have been admissible for a non-propensity purpose under another

77. 385 U.S. 554, 569 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
78. Id. at 555-56.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 567-69.
81. Id. at 564 (“But it has never been thought that such [due process] cases establish this Court as a rule-making organ for the promulgation of state rules of
criminal procedure.”).
82. Id. at 568-69 (“It would be a wholly unjustifiable encroachment by this
Court upon the constitutional power of States to promulgate their own rules of
evidence to try their own state-created crimes in their own state courts, so long as
their rules are not prohibited by any provision of the United States Constitution,
which these rules are not.”).
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universally-recognized propensity exception83 and observed that
the admission of the evidence was required to prove allegations
84
under Texas’s recidivism statutory framework.
Chief Justice Warren’s partial dissent challenged the majority’s due process conclusions, contending that the introduction of
evidence purely for propensity purposes violates federal due proc85
ess. Chief Justice Warren stated:
While this Court has never held that the use of prior convictions
to show nothing more than a disposition to commit crime would
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
our decisions exercising supervisory power over criminal trials in
federal courts, as well as decisions by courts of appeals and of
state courts, suggest that evidence of prior crimes introduced for
no purpose other than to86show criminal disposition would violate
the Due Process Clause.

Although this sentiment is expressed in dissent, the Chief Justice
observed that the majority opinion did not conflict with this inter87
pretation of the Due Process Clause.
Chief Justice Warren’s approach to propensity evidence recognizes that the admission of other-misconduct evidence is not ab88
solutely barred by federal due process. Some such evidence has
89
been traditionally admitted to impeach a defendant’s testimony,
90
to counter defense evidence of a defendant’s good character, and
for other non-propensity purposes, including those identified in
91
FRE 404(b)(1). When evidence is admitted in these cases for a
non-propensity purpose, Chief Justice Warren observed that the
defendant’s due process rights can be protected by judicial balanc92
ing of probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice. On this

83. Id. at 560-61.
84. Id. at 565-66.
85. Id. at 569-87.
86. Id. at 572-74 (Warren, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
87. Id. at 575-76 (“I do not understand the opinion to assert that this Court
would find consistent with due process the admission of prior-crimes evidence for
no purpose other than what probative value it has bearing on an accused’s disposition to commit a crime currently charged. It ignores this issue. . . .”).
88. Id. at 576.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 577.
92. Id. at 578 (“The problem thus becomes the delicate one of balancing probative value against the possibility of prejudice, and the result for most state and
federal courts . . . has been that the trial judge is given discretion to draw the balance in the context of the trial.”).
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basis, “it is apparent that prior-convictions evidence introduced for
certain specific purposes relating to the determination of guilt or
innocence, other than to show a general criminal disposition, would
93
not violate the Due Process Clause.” Thus, Chief Justice Warren
followed the historical admission of such evidence for nonpropensity purposes to its logical conclusion—when admitted for
non-propensity purposes, such evidence is “not so inherently preju94
dicial” that due process requires its categorical exclusion.
By contrast, when such evidence is introduced for pure propensity purposes, Chief Justice Warren concluded that its admission would necessarily violate the Due Process Clause and require
categorical exclusion. This conclusion is derived from the threat
that the use of pure propensity evidence poses to three bedrock
due process principles, which are discussed below.
1. The Presumption of Innocence. It is beyond dispute that
95
the presumption of innocence is a component of due process.
“The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and
its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our
96
criminal law.” The use of pure propensity evidence, however, undermines the jury’s conceptual ability meaningfully to presume the
innocence of the accused, and this consequence threatens the principle of the presumption of innocence that is a foundation of due
process.
Recognition of the potential for pure propensity evidence to
undercut the presumption of innocence is not new. In Spencer,
Chief Justice Warren observed that “[e]vidence of prior convictions has been forbidden because it jeopardizes the presumption of
97
innocence of the crime currently charged.” In 1977, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit clearly contemplated this unmistakable threat to due process in holding that prior acts evidence can-

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976).
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
Spencer, 385 U.S. at 575.
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not be employed for pure propensity purposes.98 Beginning as
99
early as 1901, American courts have so held for over a century.
2. Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. In criminal cases, it is
well-settled that due process requires that the accused be acquitted
unless the state can prove the defendant’s factual and legal guilt
100
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” Even if one assumes that the admission of other-misconduct evidence for propensity purposes does
not shift the entire burden of proof from the state to the defendant
by undermining the presumption of innocence, the admission of
such evidence invariably lowers the state’s burden of persuasion.
Every trial lawyer knows from personal experience what a sea
change may occur in a jury’s attitude toward the accused’s case
even when other-misconduct evidence is legitimately admitted for
a non-propensity purpose.
In his prescient opinion in Spencer, Chief Justice Warren also
recognized that the admission of propensity evidence for propensity purposes threatened to lighten the state’s burden of persuasion, noting that “[r]ecognition of the prejudicial effect of priorconvictions evidence has traditionally been related to the requirement of our criminal law that the State prove beyond a reasonable
101
doubt the commission of a specific criminal act.” Almost 25 years
later, Justice O’Connor echoed Chief Justice Warren’s concerns
about the jury’s misuse of propensity evidence. In response to a
jury instruction that encompassed propensity language, Justice
O’Connor observed that this language may “relieve[] the State of
its burden of proving the identity of [the] murderer beyond a rea102
sonable doubt.”
The voices of Chief Justice Warren and Justice O’Connor, descending from the nation’s highest court, are not alone in their
condemnation of propensity evidence used for propensity purposes
based on its threat to the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.
Federal courts and state courts have prohibited the introduction of
propensity evidence based on the “beyond a reasonable doubt” ra-

98. United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977) (“A concomitant of the presumption of innocence is that a defendant must be tried for what he
did, not for who he is. The reason for this rule is that it is likely that the defendant
will be seriously prejudiced by the admission of evidence indicating that he has
committed other crimes.”).
99. People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 293-94 (N.Y. 1901).
100. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
101. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 575.
102. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 76 (1991) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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tionale,103 and the warning has been voiced by commentators as
104
well.
3. Prohibition Against Status Crimes. The tendency to convict a defendant because of his purported bad character endangers
yet another fundamental guarantee of due process—the accused
105
cannot be found guilty on the basis of his criminal “status.” Chief
Justice Warren summarized this concern: “A jury might punish an
accused for being guilty of a previous offense, or feel that incarceration is justified because the accused is a ‘bad man,’ without re106
gard to his guilt of the crime currently charged.”
Pure propensity evidence affirmatively encourages jurors to
convict the defendant because of his anti-social character, instead
of on the basis of sufficient evidence that the defendant committed
the charged offense. A leading commentator summarized this concern:
As a nation, we are committed to the proposition that the state
may not punish a person for his or her character; the state may
criminalize only antisocial acts. Many continental countries routinely admit evidence of the defendant’s past misconduct; but
under our system, it is axiomatic that the defendant need answer
107
only for the crime he or she is currently charged with.

The Michigan Supreme Court conveyed this sentiment most appropriately: “[I]n our system of jurisprudence, we try cases, rather
108
than persons.”
Courts recognize the serious threat to due process posed by
the use of pure propensity evidence to convict an individual because of his status. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
109
McKinney v. Rees acknowledged that when the use of other-

103. See, e.g., McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1993); People v.
Garceau, 862 P.2d 664, 692 (Cal. 1993).
104. See, e.g., Natali & Stigall, supra note 61, at 32-34. The Alaska Supreme
Court has placed great currency in this aspect of due process, noting in Oksoktaruk v. State, 611 P.2d 521 (Alaska 1980), that pure propensity evidence “dilut[es]
the requirement that present guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Oksoktaruk, 611 P.2d at 524.
105. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (concluding that
states may not criminalize the status of drug addiction).
106. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 575 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); accord Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 18081 (1997).
107. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 1:03,
at 9 (1996) (citations omitted).
108. People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Mich. 1988).
109. 993 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1993).
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misconduct evidence, even for a legitimate, non-propensity purpose, makes it reasonably likely that the jury will convict the accused on the basis of his bad character and prior acts, its admission
110
violates the community’s basic standards of fair play.
C. A Valuable Comparison: Dowling v. United States, NonPropensity Purpose, and Three Due Process Safeguards
In Dowling v. United States,111 the United States Supreme
Court held that other-misconduct evidence can properly be admitted as long as the defendant’s right not to be convicted by improper
propensity inferences can effectively be insured. Thus, Dowling
implicitly recognizes that admission of such evidence purely for
propensity purposes would violate due process.
1. Dowling v. United States: The Legitimate Admission of
Other-Misconduct Evidence for Non-Propensity Purposes. In
Dowling, the Court was called upon to assess the constitutionality
112
of FRE 404(b), which, as noted above, allows the state to introduce evidence of prior crimes, acts, or wrongs for “non-propensity”
purposes, such as proving the defendant’s intent, motive, opportu113
Consistent with historical
nity, identity, plan, or preparation.
practice, the Court ultimately concluded that the admission of such
evidence for non-propensity purposes is not absolutely barred by
114
federal due process.
In July of 1985, $12,000 was stolen during a bank robbery on
115
the island of St. Croix in the United States Virgin Islands. After
stealing the money, the robber exited the bank, darted about the

110. Id. at 1385. The Ninth Circuit observed that:
[h]is was not the trial by peers promised by the Constitution of the
United States, conducted in accordance with centuries-old fundamental
conceptions of justice. It is part of our community’s sense of fair play
that people are convicted because of what they have done, not who they
are.
Id. at 1386.
The Alaska Supreme Court has endorsed this fear that a defendant will not
be capable of defending against the particular crime charged if propensity evidence is presented at trial. See Adkinson v. State, 611 P.2d 528, 531 (Alaska 1980)
(stating that when bad character is inferred, “the defendant has been effectively
denied his right to defend against the particular crime . . . charged.”).
111. 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
112. Id. at 343.
113. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
114. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 354.
115. Id. at 344.
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street briefly, and commandeered a taxi van to make his getaway.116
The culprit removed his mask as he exited the scene of the crime,
117
and an eyewitness identified the robber as Reuben Dowling.
Other witnesses saw Dowling driving the stolen van outside of
118
Dowling subsequently was
town shortly after the robbery.
charged with bank robbery, armed robbery, and several other
119
crimes.
Two weeks after the bank robbery, two men entered the home
of a woman in the same city where the bank robbery had oc120
curred. One intruder was wearing a ski mask and brandishing a
handgun, and a struggle ensued between this man and the
121
woman. During the struggle, the woman unmasked the intruder,
122
Based on this incident,
whom she later identified as Dowling.
Dowling was charged with burglary, attempted robbery, assault,
123
and weapons offenses. Before Dowling’s bank robbery trial, he
124
was tried for this burglary and acquitted.
During Dowling’s bank robbery trial, the prosecution presented evidence about the burglary for which Dowling was acquit125
ted. Specifically, the state called the burglary victim as a witness.
The woman testified that an armed man wearing a ski mask en126
The
tered her house, and that the armed man was Dowling.
prosecution sought to introduce this evidence for two purposes.
First, because the bank robber had worn a ski mask and carried a
handgun similar to the gun carried by the woman’s assailant, the
prosecution contended that the woman’s testimony strengthened
127
Secthe prosecution’s identification of Dowling as the culprit.
ond, the government sought to link Dowling to Delroy Christian,
128
the other man who entered the woman’s house. During the bank
robbery trial, a police officer testified that Christian had parked a
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 344-45.
122. Id. at 345.
123. Id.
124. Id. This summary, to a degree, is an oversimplification: Dowling’s first
bank robbery trial ended in a hung jury, and after he was convicted at his second
trial, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed his conviction. Id. at
344.
125. Id. at 345.
126. Id. at 344-45.
127. Id. at 345.
128. Id.
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car at the front of the bank shortly before the bank robbery occurred.129 One of the car doors was open and the officer had in130
structed Christian to close it. Christian drove away shortly there131
after, before the robber emerged from the bank. The prosecution
contended that Christian was designated to drive the getaway car,
and the prosecution asserted that the robber’s distress upon exiting
the bank and the robber’s impulsive attempt to steal a getaway ve132
hicle corroborated this theory.
Dowling appealed his conviction,133 alleging that the admission
of the woman’s testimony was an unconstitutional violation of the
prohibition against Double Jeopardy and a violation of federal due
134
process. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
district court verdict, concluding that the admission of the evidence
135
The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding
was harmless error.
that the admission of the other-misconduct evidence, for nonpropensity purposes under FRE 404(b), did not violate the Double
136
For present purJeopardy Clause or the Due Process Clause.
137
poses, discussion is limited to the Court’s due process reasoning.
The Court rejected Dowling’s contention that admission of the
other-misconduct evidence violated due process because of the inherent risk that the jury might convict him based on a propensity
inference arising from his other-misconduct. In rejecting this claim,
the Dowling court relied upon the trial judge’s ability to exclude
unfairly prejudicial evidence under the judicial balancing required
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. After his third trial, see supra note 124, Dowling was convicted and sentenced to 70 years’ imprisonment. Id. at 344.
134. Id. at 347.
135. United States v. Dowling, 855 F.2d 114, 122-24 (3d Cir. 1988).
136. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 352-53.
137. Dowling presented four independent grounds upon which the admission of
the woman’s testimony was fundamentally unfair and therefore violated due process. Specifically, Dowling argued that the admission of prior conduct evidence for
non-propensity purposes violates due process because (1) evidence of acquitted
conduct is inherently unreliable, (2) the jury may convict the defendant based on
inferences from his past conduct, (3) evidence of acquitted conduct leads to inconsistent jury verdicts, and (4) introducing evidence of acquitted conduct forces the
defendant to answer the same accusation in a later proceeding. Because the first,
third and fourth of Dowling’s contentions challenge the constitutionality of admitting evidence of acquitted prior conduct, only Dowling’s second contention bears
upon whether the admission of propensity evidence under any circumstance is
prohibited by federal due process.
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by FRE 403.138 The court thus concluded that in cases where the
risk of a propensity inference was not outweighed by the probative
value on a non-propensity issue, the judge would exclude the evidence under FRE 403, and the due process issue would never
139
arise.
The Dowling Court also emphasized that the trial court instructed the jury, both when the woman testifying about Dowling
left the stand and again during the court’s final charge, that the
evidence of Dowling’s prior conduct, for which he was acquitted,
was introduced only for the limited purposes of establishing his
140
The Court
identity and connecting him with Delroy Christian.
concluded that “[e]specially in light of the limiting [jury] instructions provided by the trial judge, we cannot hold that the introduc141
tion of [the woman’s] testimony merits . . . condemnation.”
Dowling simply recognizes the traditional view: due process
does not prohibit other-misconduct evidence offered for a legitimate, non-propensity purpose in those cases where its probative
value is not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice
and where the jury’s consideration of the evidence is effectively
limited by judicial instruction. In other words, when othermisconduct evidence is offered for a non-propensity purpose, admission or exclusion depends on the facts, circumstances, and trial
dynamics of the particular case. Based on these procedural safeguards (the judge’s ability to exclude prejudicial evidence pursuant
to FRE 403 balancing and the issuance of a jury instruction), the
Supreme Court held that the admission of other-misconduct evidence for non-propensity purposes does not violate a defendant’s
142
due process rights.
2. The Three Procedural Safeguards. Consistent with Dowling, trial judges are obliged to protect the accused’s due process
rights at three different stages: at the pre-admission stage, during
the trial when the evidence is introduced, and in the final charge to
the jury. Because these three procedural safeguards form the basis
for the Supreme Court’s decision that the admission of othermisconduct evidence for non-propensity purposes may be able to
138. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”).
139. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 353.
140. Id. at 345-46.
141. Id. at 353.
142. See id. at 354.
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survive a due process challenge, each safeguard will be addressed
briefly.
First, other-misconduct evidence may be admitted for nonpropensity purposes only if it satisfies the judicial balancing required by FRE 403, which is almost identical to Alaska’s counterpart, ARE 403. According to ARE 403, “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
143
Under this balneedless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
ancing, the court must weigh two very real, but conceptually distinct, concepts. On one hand, the trial judge must consider the
probative value of the evidence with regard to the specific, limited
non-propensity purpose for which it is offered. On the other hand,
the trial judge must protect the defendant’s due process rights by
ensuring that the defendant will not be found guilty because of the
“unfair prejudice” caused by propensity or bad character inferences.
144
In
Assume, for example, the following course of events.
2000, Joe Fairbanks is charged with physically assaulting a young
boy, A.B. The prosecution alleges that Fairbanks, a local youth
baseball coach, had repeatedly told A.B., who was one of the players, that he needed to improve his batting skills. After three weeks
of such criticism, Fairbanks asked A.B. to stay late one day for extra batting practice. During the batting exercise, Fairbanks intentionally hurled the baseball at the child, hitting A.B. in the back,
the ribcage, and the side of his head. A.B. subsequently informed
his parents of Fairbanks’ conduct, and A.B.’s parents reported the
incident to the police.
During the course of criminal discovery, the prosecution
learned that the defendant was involved in a similar assault the
previous year. As a youth soccer coach, Fairbanks continually told

143. ALASKA R. EVID. 403. ARE 403 deviates from FRE 403 in one important
respect: under the federal rule, relevant evidence may be excluded if the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion, etc., substantially outweighs the probative value of the
evidence. Under the Alaska rule, these dangers need only outweigh the probative
value of the evidence to justify exclusion. Because of this difference, the Alaska
rule would provide greater protection to the objector under the 403 balancing test.
Unfortunately, as this Article demonstrates in Part V, Alaska’s propensity exceptions disable ARE 403 balancing and undermine the protection afforded by the
Alaska rule.
144. This course of events is entirely fictional and is intended solely as a basis
for evaluation. Any similarity between these events and any actual events is coincidental.
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his goalie, L.M., that his skills needed to improve. After three
weeks of such criticism, Fairbanks told the goalie to stay late after
practice. During this extra practice time, Fairbanks positioned
himself less than ten yards from the goal and directed powerful
shots directly at L.M. Although the shots repeatedly hit L.M. in
the head and the midsection, Fairbanks continued the exercise until L.M. was unable to continue. L.M. informed his parents, but
L.M.’s parents did not inform the police until they heard about
Fairbanks’ alleged abuse of A.B. one year later. The prosecution
seeks to admit the evidence of Fairbanks’ abuse of L.M. for two
non-propensity purposes: first, to demonstrate that Fairbanks had a
well-conceived plan (namely, continual criticism of the athlete followed by a required post-practice one-on-one exercise); and second, to demonstrate that the abuse of A.B. was neither an accident
nor a legitimate coaching technique.
If the trial judge decides that the evidence of Fairbanks’ prior
abuse of L.M. is relevant to these non-propensity purposes, the
evidence must also satisfy FRE 403 balancing to be admissible. On
one hand, the judge will consider the probative value of the evidence of Fairbanks’ prior treatment of L.M. to prove Fairbanks’
plan or to prove that Fairbanks’ infliction of injury was not accidental or justified. Commonly, this will involve evaluation of the
recency, similarity, extent, and nexus of the prior misconduct to the
non-propensity issues. On the other hand, the judge will evaluate
the extent to which the evidence of Fairbanks’ treatment of L.M.
will unfairly prejudice the jury, promote bad character inferences,
and/or lead the jury to convict Fairbanks because of his propensity
to commit crimes. In doing so, the court will assess the ease or difficulty lay jurors will have in separating permissible from impermissible purposes, the centrality of the non-propensity purposes to the
real, legitimate issues in the case, and the degree of confidence the
judge has in this jury to follow the jury instructions.
In this manner, FRE 403 balancing provides a substantial procedural safeguard that protects against the improper use of evidence in the precise manner feared by courts since the seventeenth
century. The judge is called upon to identify and isolate the unfair
prejudice implicated by the evidence, and, if the risk of unfair
prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence, the judge
must exclude the evidence.
The second procedural safeguard is integral to the proper use
of other-misconduct evidence that is admitted at trial. Because this
evidence is introduced for a non-propensity purpose, its relevance
at trial is limited to the non-propensity purpose, or purposes for
which its introduction has been authorized. If the prosecution
strays from the non-propensity purpose in its presentation of
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and/or argument on the evidence, defense counsel is empowered to
object to the questions, testimony, or arguments for lack of relevancy and for violation of the court’s order. Moreover, the prosecution’s improper use of the evidence for pure propensity purposes
could easily cause a mistrial or justify a retrial on appeal. When
such evidence is presented for a non-propensity purpose, its use
must actually conform to this limited purpose.
This procedural safeguard is essential, and it significantly limits the conduct of the prosecutor at trial. Restricted by this safeguard, the prosecution is powerless to employ charged rhetoric to
impugn the defendant’s character or to provoke the jury to convict
the defendant based on his criminal propensity. Explicitly or implicitly, consciously or subconsciously, the prosecution cannot
summon broad generalizations and fevered advocacy to “arraign
145
[the defendant’s] whole life.”
The final safeguard for the defendant—jury instructions—
serves as a final reminder to the jury that the other-misconduct evidence admitted at trial must not be considered as proof that the defendant acted in conformance with his general propensity during
the alleged crime. Typically, the court instructs the jury both when
the evidence is admitted, and again in the court’s final charge, that
the evidence has been admitted “for a limited purpose,” and that to
convict the defendant to any degree on the basis of speculation
about his character or criminal propensity would be improper and
“unfair.” While some commentators and courts have questioned
the degree of protection provided by jury instructions of this na146
ture, Alaska courts presume that the jury can meaningfully ad147
Where the judge’s instructions are
here to these instructions.
given in emphatic language and clearly identify the non-propensity
purpose, the impermissible uses, and the reasons why consideration

145. Harrison’s Trial, 12 How. St. Tr. 834, 864 (Old Bailey 1692).
146. Parish v. State, 477 P.2d 1005, 1011 (Alaska 1970) (Boney, C.J., dissenting). For instance, Justice Jackson observed in Krulewitch v. United States that
“[t]he naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to
the jury [is something that] all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.”
336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (internal citations omitted); see also HARRY KALVAN &
HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 127-30, 177-80 (1966) (providing empirical
studies showing that Justice Jackson’s view is likely correct); Note, Other Crimes
Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 778 (1961)
(contending that the jury instructions are illogical and cannot be followed).
147. See State v. McDonald, 872 P.2d 627, 654-55 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994);
Whiteaker v. State, 808 P.2d 270, 277 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
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is so limited, the likelihood of jury compliance is greatly increased.148
Viewed collectively, these three procedural safeguards adequately protect a criminal defendant’s federal due process rights
when other-misconduct evidence is admitted for a non-propensity
149
purpose. Of course, these procedural safeguards do not compel a
trial court to exclude such evidence whenever it might prejudice
150
the jury. In fact, because it is commonly accepted that the introduction of other-misconduct evidence will always entail some risk
of prejudice, these safeguards do not necessarily protect the defendant from all inappropriate use of the evidence by the jury. The
Dowling decision articulates that such evidence is admissible provided both that the judge has found valid non-propensity relevance
in the evidence and that he or she uses means which ensure that the
risk of unfair prejudice is minimized. This observation, which
proved critical to upholding the constitutionality of introducing
other-misconduct evidence for non-propensity purposes, also provides the foundation for understanding the fundamental flaw in the
Alaska Court of Appeals’ recent decisions upholding Alaska’s propensity provisions.
IV. THREE CASES, BUT ONE DEFECTIVE RATIONALE:
THE ALLEN-WARDLOW-FUZZARD TRILOGY
Over the last five years, the Alaska Court of Appeals has upheld the constitutionality of three propensity exceptions to ARE
404(b)(1)—the first aggressor exception, the sexual assault exception, and the domestic violence exception. Though the intermediate court has not passed upon the constitutionality of the child
abuse exception in a published opinion, it has routinely imported
its rationale from other propensity exception cases into memorandum opinions declaring the child abuse exception constitutional as
151
well.
148. Use Note to Alaska Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction No. 1.25 (1999),
available at http://www.state.ak.us/courts/crimins.htm#1.
149. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 353 (1990).
150. “[N]ot all admissions of [prejudicial] evidence are errors of constitutional
dimension. The introduction of improper evidence against a defendant does not
amount to a violation of due process unless the evidence ‘is so extremely unfair
that its admission violates fundamental conceptions of justice.’” Brooks Holland,
Section 60.41 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law: The Sexual Assault Reform Act of 1999 Challenges Molineux and Due Process, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
435, 438-39 (1999) (quoting Dunnigan v. Kean, 137 F.3d 117, 125 (2d Cir. 1998)).
151. In a 1999 memorandum opinion that did not create legal precedent, the
Alaska Court of Appeals relied on the reasoning in Allen to uphold the constitu-
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In Allen v. State,152 the intermediate court upheld the constitu153
tionality of ARE 404(a)(2)’s broad “first aggressor” exception.
Allen contains the most extensive articulation of the court’s rationale for rejecting due process challenges to pure propensity evidence. Allen was charged with second-degree murder arising out
154
When Allen claimed selfof an altercation with another man.
defense, the state offered evidence of Allen’s past violent acts to
enable the jury to infer that Allen’s violent character made him
155
Although the intermediate
likely to act as the first aggressor.
156
court reversed Allen’s conviction, it concluded that the first ag157
gressor exception was constitutional.
Initially, the court conceded that the use of character evidence
under the first aggressor exception amounts to propensity evidence

tionality of ARE 404(b)(2)’s child abuse exception. In Geerhart v. State, the defendant appealed his conviction on seven counts of first-degree sexual assault and
seven counts of incest. No. 4073, 1999 Alaska App. LEXIS 51, at *1 (Alaska Ct.
App. July 7, 1999). Geerhart claimed that the trial judge’s admission of Geerhart’s prior sexual activity with his niece, pursuant to ARE 404(b)(2), unconstitutionally diluted the state’s burden of proof. Id. at *15. After briefly observing
that the trial judge instructed the jury regarding the state’s burden of proof, the
court invoked the reasoning in Allen, without any further discussion, to uphold the
constitutionality of the child abuse exception, noting that:
Geerhart claims that the admission of evidence of his prior sexual misconduct under Rule 404(b)(2) violates due process. We rejected a similar attack on Rule 404(a)(2) in Allen v. State. Geerhart has not offered a
convincing argument why we should analyze his due process claim any
differently than the claim in Allen. We conclude that Rule 404(b)(2)
does not violate Geerhart’s constitutional rights.
Id. at *16 (internal citations omitted).
152. 945 P.2d 1233 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
153. Id. at 1239.
154. Id. at 1234.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1235. The court of appeals upheld the constitutionality of ARE
404(a)(2), but reversed the conviction on other grounds. The court concluded that
the state was not required to establish the defendant’s violent character in order to
disprove the defendant’s self-defense theory—violent people may act in selfdefense, and non-violent people may act aggressively. Therefore, although evidence of the defendant’s character was admissible pursuant to ARE 404(a)(2),
proof of the defendant’s character was not an “essential” element of the crime or
of the defendant’s claim of self-defense. Under these circumstances, the court of
appeals concluded that ARE 405 prohibits the introduction of the defendant’s
specific prior violent acts; instead, the state was limited to providing reputation or
opinion evidence of the defendant’s violent character. Id. at 1240.
157. Id. at 1239-40.
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that is normally excluded at trial.158 First aggressor character evidence “is introduced for the very purpose normally barred by the
evidence rules: to prove that [a person] acted in conformity with his
159
or her [character trait].” Moreover, the court acknowledged that
the bar on the use of pure propensity evidence was based on the
concern that the jury would not hold the state to the traditional
160
burden of proof in a criminal trial.
Nonetheless, the intermediate court upheld the constitutionality of the first aggressor exception on two grounds. First, the court
noted that the admission of other-misconduct evidence was not absolutely barred, because such evidence was not excluded at com161
mon law when the defendant placed his character at issue. Second, the court claimed that the procedural safeguard provided by
the balancing test of ARE 403 satisfied due process demands. According to the court, “Evidence Rule 404(a)(2) does not eliminate
162
the weighing of relevance versus potential prejudice.” In fact, the
163
rule itself explicitly provides for such balancing. Judicial balancing under FRE 403 played a critical role in the United States Supreme Court’s Dowling decision—permitting the use of othermisconduct evidence for non-propensity purposes—and the intermediate court asserted that ARE 403 balancing “similarly” saved
the provision from violating the state and federal due process
clauses.
Four years after Allen, the court of appeals employed Allen’s
due process analysis and upheld the validity of the ARE 404(b)(3)
164
sexual assault exception. In Wardlow v. State, the defendant ap-

158. Id. at 1238 (“[The defendant] objects that this use of character evidence—
as circumstantial proof of a defendant’s likely conduct during a particular episode—amounts to “propensity” evidence, a type of evidence normally prohibited.
This is true, but it is not a valid objection to admission of the evidence.”).
159. Id. (quoting McCracken v. State, 914 P.2d 893, 898 (Alaska Ct. App.
1996)).
160. Allen, 945 P.2d at 1238 (“[A] jury might be tempted to relax the government’s normal burden of proof if they were convinced that the defendant was a
bad person.”).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(ii):
The court shall conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury in order to determine whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the victim. The hearing may be
conducted in camera where there is a danger of unwarranted invasion of
the privacy of the victim.
164. 2 P.3d 1238 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).

DROPKIN_FMT.DOC

206

11/01/01 3:14 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[18:2

pealed his conviction for assault, sexual assault, and kidnapping,165
arguing that evidence of a prior attempted sexual assault should
166
have been excluded at trial. The court simply cited Allen and rejected the argument:
Wardlow’s basic contention is that the legislature is constitutionally prohibited from authorizing the admission of other crimes
evidence to prove “propensity”—i.e., to prove a person’s character when character is being offered as circumstantial evidence
that the person acted true to character during the episode being
litigated. We rejected this argument in Allen v. State, and we re167
affirm that decision here.

Although Wardlow invoked the underlying rationale in Allen to
uphold the constitutionality of a propensity exception, Wardlow
was not the court of appeals’ final statement on the constitutionality of these exceptions.
168
In Fuzzard v. State, the intermediate court again relied upon
Allen, without any further analysis, to validate the domestic violence exception embodied in ARE 404(b)(4). Fuzzard was convicted of third-degree assault after the state introduced evidence of
a prior incident in which Fuzzard broke into the victim’s apartment
and pulled the victim’s phone from the wall as she attempted to call
169
the police. The court reasoned as follows:
Fuzzard argues that Evidence Rule 404(b)(4) violates the due
process clause of the constitution because it authorizes a court to
admit evidence of prior domestic violence for “propensity” purposes—that is, as circumstantial proof that the defendant was
likely to engage in the domestic violence charged in the current
case . . . .
Allen involved a due process challenge to another subsection of
Evidence Rule 404—subsection (a)(2), which authorizes a court
to admit evidence of the defendant’s character for violence to
rebut a claim that the victim was the first aggressor. We held
that, because trial judges retain the authority under Evidence

165. Id. at 1241.
166. Id. at 1248.
167. Id. (internal footnotes omitted); see also McGill v. State, 18 P.3d 77, 81
(Alaska Ct. App. 2001) (reaffirming the holdings in Allen and Wardlow).
168. 13 P.3d 1163 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
169. Id. at 1163-64. The state contended that the evidence was admissible under
ARE 404(b)(1) to establish the reasonableness of the victim’s fear and the nature
of the victim’s relationship with Fuzzard. Although the court concluded that the
evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b)(1)—to establish the victim’s fear, to
indicate that the incident was not an accident, and to show the nature of their relationship, see id. at 1165, the trial court also found that the domestic violence exception was constitutional and provided an alternative basis for the admission of
the evidence, id. at 1164-65.
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Rule 403 to exclude evidence that is more prejudicial than probative, Evidence Rule 404(a)(2) did not violate the guarantee of
due process. We reach the same conclusion regarding Evidence
170
Rule 404(b)(4).

In Wardlow and Fuzzard, the court of appeals mechanically applied the Allen rationale to uphold the constitutionality of Alaska’s
propensity exceptions. In Allen and its progeny, the intermediate
court simply waves the judicial wand of Rule 403 balancing, then
announces that the significant threats to due process have magically disappeared. This judicial sleight-of-hand evinces the court’s
complete failure to perceive and comprehend the conceptual and
practical impossibility of meaningfully applying the Rule 403 balancing test to other-misconduct evidence admitted specifically for
propensity purposes.
V. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF ARE 403 BALANCING OF PURE
PROPENSITY EVIDENCE
The Alaska Court of Appeals, following the lead of some federal circuit courts, has upheld Alaska’s pure propensity provisions
explicitly because of the purported ability of ARE 403 balancing to
insure due process. The intermediate court also asserts that, but
for the applicability of ARE 403, the pure propensity provisions
would violate due process. Because meaningful balancing under
ARE 403 is analytically and practically impossible when evidence is
offered under Alaska’s propensity provisions, these provisions
171
violate the due process rights of the accused.
When other-misconduct evidence is offered for a nonpropensity purpose, ARE 403 requires the trial judge to balance
the probative value of the evidence for a legitimate, limited pur170. Id. at 1166 (internal citations omitted).
171. In Dowling, three procedural safeguards were relied on to satisfy due process: balancing under Federal Rule 403, limiting prosecution evidence and argument to non-propensity purposes, and the issuance of a limiting jury instruction.
In addition to neutering Rule 403 balancing, Alaska’s propensity provisions totally
disable the second and third due process safeguards as well. Under these provisions, other-misconduct evidence is admitted for its propensity purpose—consequently, the prosecution will not be limited in the inferences which it asks the jury
to draw from the accused’s prior conduct. Similarly, the trial judge cannot give a
limiting instruction, because the evidence has been admitted for the previously
impermissible propensity purpose. Simply put, there is nothing left to limit. The
court of appeals predictably rested its due process finding in Allen on the availability of 403 balancing because the other two procedural safeguards—limiting the
use of the evidence at trial and issuing a jury instruction—were conclusively foreclosed by the legislature’s approval of the use of the evidence for propensity purposes.
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pose against the risk that the evidence will be misused by the jury
to infer guilt from propensity. This judicial task is analytically and
practically sound because the legitimate probative value of the evidence is conceptually distinct from its potential prejudicial impact.
The judge can adequately assess these two competing considerations, as well as the likely efficacy or inadequacy of limiting instructions, in determining whether to admit the evidence.
By contrast, meaningful balancing is impossible when the evidence is admitted for a propensity purpose because the judge no
longer has distinct, conflicting interests to weigh. By legislative
fiat, the unfairly prejudicial impact of this evidence—recognized as
such for centuries—becomes its probative value. By redefining the
previously impermissible and unfairly prejudicial propensity inference as “probative,” the Alaska legislature has thus disabled ARE
403 balancing because all of the weight has been placed on the
same side of the scales.
The court of appeals is firm in its conviction that the Alaska
legislature has foreclosed trial judges from treating the prejudice
that arises from propensity evidence as “unfair prejudice” in the
framework of ARE 403 balancing. In Fuzzard, the court of appeals observed that the prior acts of domestic violence “were admitted for the very purpose advanced by the legislature . . . . Although evidence of other acts of domestic violence does show
propensity in a domestic violence prosecution, under Rule
404(b)(4) the evidence’s tendency in this regard can no longer be
172
Similarly, the court of appeals condeemed unfair prejudice.”
cluded in Wardlow:
When evidence of other sexual assaults and attempted sexual assaults is admissible under Rule 404(b)(3), and when the probative value of this evidence is weighed against its potential for unfair prejudice, the trial judge’s assessment of “unfair prejudice”
no longer includes the fact that the evidence tends
to prove the de173
fendant’s propensity to engage in sexual assault.

What the intermediate court has failed to do, however, is to explain
how the empty gesture of one-side-only balancing can possibly save
the legislature’s excess from condemnation under the Due Process
Clause.
If trial judges are foreclosed from considering the prejudicial
impact of the admission of other-misconduct evidence because the
legislature declares that such evidence is no longer “unfair,” then
172. Fuzzard v. State, 13 P.3d 1163, 1167 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000) (emphasis
added).
173. Wardlow v. State, 2 P.3d 1238, 1247 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000) (emphasis
added).
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the legislature has completely eviscerated the lone remaining safeguard that protects the defendant’s due process rights.174 For five
years, the court of appeals has resolved this constitutional dilemma
by speaking out of both sides of its institutional mouth—proclaiming in one breath that a trial judge is not permitted to consider the
dangerous inferences that flow from propensity evidence while assessing “unfair prejudice” under ARE 403, but declaring in the
next breath that ARE 403 provides sufficient procedural safeguards to protect the defendant’s due process rights.
In contrast to the intermediate court’s legerdemain, the
Alaska Supreme Court has been clear and unequivocal in rejecting
175
propensity inferences. In Fields v. State, the court articulated a
two-step framework for evaluating the admissibility of other176
misconduct evidence. The trial court must initially determine if
the evidence is admissible for a permissible, non-propensity purpose. If, and only if, it is admissible for a non-propensity purpose,
the evidence must then be subjected to ARE 403 balancing. The
judge must exclude the evidence if its prejudicial impact substan177
tially outweighs its probative value.
178
In Oksoktaruk v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court specifically addressed the admissibility of other-misconduct evidence for
pure propensity purposes. The court observed that “it is a presumption in our law that the prejudicial effect of introducing a
prior crime outweighs what probative value may exist with regard
to propensity. No case-by-case balancing is permitted; a prior
179
Thus, if such
crime may not be admitted to show propensity.”
evidence does not serve a permissible, non-propensity purpose,
there is an irrebuttable presumption that the evidence is inadmissible—regardless of and because of the potential probative value of

174. See supra note 171.
175. 629 P.2d 46 (Alaska 1981).
176. The Alaska Supreme Court wrote:
It is by now firmly rooted in Alaska that evidence of other crimes or
prior misconduct is not admissible to show bad character or propensity to
commit crime. Such evidence may be admissible, however, where relevant to a material fact in issue, such as motive, intent, knowledge, plan or
scheme, and when its probative value outweighs it prejudicial impact.
Hence, we must initially determine whether [the propensity evidence]
was relevant to any material issue . . . other than [the defendant’s] general character or propensity to commit crimes.
Id. at 49 (citations omitted).
177. Id.
178. 611 P.2d 521 (Alaska 1980).
179. Id. at 524.
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the evidence—in establishing the accused’s criminal propensity
and/or bad character.180
The irrebuttable presumption holding in Oksoktaruk appears
to be constitutionally derived, and if the holding in Oksoktaruk was
of constitutional status—as its context implies—the Alaska propensity exceptions are patently unconstitutional. Immediately before
the Alaska Supreme Court announced that no case-by-case balancing of pure propensity evidence is permitted, the court stated:
The danger inherent in informing a jury that a defendant has
committed a prior criminal act is self-evident: it is all too likely
that a determinative inference of present guilt will be drawn
from the fact of the prior act, thus diluting the requirement that
181
present guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

VI. THE ALASKA DUE PROCESS CLAUSE PROHIBITS ADMISSION
OF PURE PROPENSITY EVIDENCE
Alaska’s propensity provisions pose a serious threat to the
federal due process rights of the criminally accused. The Alaska
Supreme Court may, at its discretion, conclude that the introduction of propensity evidence pursuant to these exceptions constitutes a violation of federal due process, even though the United
States Supreme Court has yet to decide this timely and important
issue.
Additionally, and independently, the Alaska Supreme Court,
182
in interpreting Article I, Section 7 of the Alaska Constitution, is
empowered to construe the protective ambit of the Alaska Due
183
Process Clause more broadly than its federal counterpart. Unlike
the due process jurisprudence of the federal courts, whose rulings
180. In State v. Lerchenstein, Justices Rabinowitz and Burke drew upon the
reasoning employed six years earlier in Oksoktaruk and concluded that if evidence
does not satisfy the first step in the two-part analysis (identifying a non-propensity
purpose), the evidence is absolutely inadmissible. 726 P.2d 546, 549 (Alaska 1986)
(Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting). Justice Rabinowitz wrote, “In my view, Oksoktaruk stands for the proposition that there is an irrebutable presumption that the
prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value of evidence offered to show propensity.” Id. Justice Rabinowitz’s conclusion derives from the clear, unqualified
statement of the Alaska Supreme Court in Oksoktaruk, and no other member of
the Lerchenstein Court expressed a contrary view.
181. Oksoktaruk, 611 P.2d at 524.
182. “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. The right of all persons to fair and just treatment in the course of legislative and executive investigations shall not be infringed.” ALASKA CONST. art.
I, § 7.
183. Burnor v. State, 829 P.2d 837, 839 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); Maeckle v.
State, 792 P.2d 686, 688 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
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limit governmental authority in 50 sovereign states, the due process
holdings of Alaska courts are unfettered by federalism considerations.
For decades, Alaska appellate courts have consistently provided greater due process protection to the accused under the
Alaska Constitution than is available under the United States Constitution, particularly when the constitutional validity of evidence
or the reliability of fact-finding in court is at issue. In Lauderdale v.
184
State, the Alaska Supreme Court held that due process requires
the preservation of an alleged drunken driver’s breath sample for
185
The court did not articulate
the accused’s independent testing.
whether this finding was compelled by federal due process or by
186
Eight
the due process requirement of the Alaska Constitution.
years after the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Lauderdale, the
187
United States Supreme Court addressed a similar issue. In Cali188
fornia v. Trombetta, the Court appeared to repudiate the conclusion reached by the Alaska Supreme Court in Lauderdale, concluding that “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require that law enforcement agencies preserve breath samples in order to introduce the results of breath189
analysis tests at trial.” Six years after the decision in Trombetta,
however, the Alaska Supreme Court reaffirmed its Lauderdale
190
holding in Gundersen v. Anchorage on the independent ground
that Alaska’s constitutional guarantee of due process mandates the

184. 548 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1976).
185. Id. at 381. The court concluded:
A denial of the right to make such analysis, that is to say, to “crossexamine” the results of the test, would be reversible error without any
need for a showing of prejudice. It would be a denial of a right to a fair
trial, and a fair trial is essential to affording an accused due process of
law.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
186. Notably, the Alaska Supreme Court cited three United States Supreme
Court cases for the proposition that a “fair trial” is essential to due process. Id. at
381 n.10 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); and Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954)).
187. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 481 (1984) (“[T]he question presented is whether the Due Process Clause requires law enforcement agencies to
preserve breath samples of suspected drunken drivers in order for the results of
breath-analysis tests to be admissible in criminal prosecutions.”).
188. Id. at 479.
189. Id. at 491.
190. 792 P.2d 673 (Alaska 1990).
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preservation of breath samples, even if federal due process does
not.191
The Alaska Supreme Court’s invocation of state due process
rights, notwithstanding contrary federal due process rulings, is not
limited to the Lauderdale-Trombetta-Gunderson line of cases. In
192
Thorne v. Department of Public Safety, the state’s highest court
found that the state’s failure to preserve a videotape of the defendant performing field sobriety tests violated the defendant’s due
193
process rights. Notably, the court ruled that the state’s good or
bad faith in destroying potentially useful evidence is not necessarily
dispositive of whether the defendant’s due process rights were vio194
lated. In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the reasoning adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v.
195
Youngblood, which requires a showing of bad faith destruction by
196
the state to establish a federal due process violation.
The decisions in Gundersen and Thorne are certainly not
anomalies in Alaska’s due process jurisprudence; on the contrary,
the Alaska Supreme Court regularly and unabashedly acknowledges its authority to interpret the Alaska due process clause more
197
broadly than federal due process. In Stephan v. State, the court
offered the following observation in holding that the Alaska Due
Process Clause mandates that the state tape-record all custodial interrogations in their entirety:
It must be emphasized that our holding is based entirely upon the
requirements of article I, section 7, of the Alaska Constitution, as
interpreted by this court. We accept the state’s argument that
custodial interrogations need not be recorded to satisfy the due
process requirements of the United States Constitution, because
a recording does not meet the standard of constitutional materiality recently enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
California v. Trombetta. In interpreting the due process clause
of the Alaska Constitution, however, we “remain free to adopt
more rigorous safeguards governing the admissibility of . . . evidence than those imposed by the Federal Constitution.” Thus,
as we have done on previous occasions, we construe Alaska’s

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 675-76.
774 P.2d 1326 (Alaska 1989).
Id. at 1330.
Id.
488 U.S. 51 (1988).
Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1330 n.9.
711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985).
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constitutional provision, in this instance, as affording rights be198
yond those guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

As discussed in Part V, supra, Alaska’s highest court has repeatedly and emphatically articulated an irrebuttable presumption
against the admission of pure propensity evidence. The Oksoktaruk court explicitly presented the prohibition as necessary to
meet the requirements of due process. Additionally, in Adkinson
199
v. State, the Court recognized the fundamental nature of the prohibition against pure propensity evidence, writing:
It is beyond dispute that where evidence of other crimes or acts
is relevant only to prove one’s character, to show that on the occasion in question he acted in conformity with that character, it is
not admissible. This is because of the unfair impact such evidence tends to have. It may give rise to a persuasive inference
that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged because he is a
200
bad person.

Six years after the decision in Adkinson, the Alaska Supreme
Court justices once again voiced their misgivings about the use of
201
In Lerchenstein,
prior crimes evidence in State v. Lerchenstein.
the state offered evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts to establish the defendant’s motive (a 404(b)(1) non-propensity purpose), prompting two justices to observe:
Admission of evidence of prior bad acts is by its nature highly
prejudicial and the outcome must be subject to careful scrutiny. . . . Prior bad acts evidence is always prejudicial. The risk of
prejudice increases where the previous offense is similar to the
202
offense for which the accused is presently on trial.

Although the Alaska Supreme Court has not yet had occasion
explicitly to hold that the use of pure propensity evidence is absolutely barred by Alaska’s Due Process Clause, the court has given
every indication that it will do so when the issue reaches it. In addition to Adkinson, Fields, Oksoktaruk, and Lerchenstein, the court
expressed its views against the use of pure propensity evidence in
203
Keith v. State observing that:

198. Id. at 1160 (citations and footnotes omitted); see also Atchak v. State, 640
P.2d 135, 150-51 (Alaska 1981) (expanding the protection of the accused against
vindictive prosecution pursuant to the Alaska Due Process Clause far beyond the
protection provided by the federal guarantee of due process); Shagloak v. State,
597 P.2d 142, 144 (Alaska 1979) (same).
199. 611 P.2d 528 (Alaska 1980).
200. Id. at 531 (Alaska 1980) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
201. 726 P.2d 546 (Alaska 1986).
202. Id. at 549, 551-52.
203. 612 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1980).

DROPKIN_FMT.DOC

214

11/01/01 3:14 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[18:2

The general rationale of the rule against allowing character evidence to be introduced by the prosecutor is that it prevents the
jury from convicting someone because he has a propensity to
commit a crime or has a past history of criminal activity and not
whether he has done the act of which he is accused. It has been
more fully expressed as follows:
“The rule is justified primarily on the ground that the probative
value of propensity evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect on a jury. The introduction of such evidence is said to create
a danger that the jury will punish the defendant for offenses
other than those charged, or at least that it will convict when unsure of guilt because it is convinced that the defendant is a bad
man deserving of punishment. In addition, it is argued that the
jury might be unable to identify with a defendant of offensive
character, and hence tend to disbelieve the evidence in his favor.
At the least, it is said that such evidence would be given greater
probative weight than it deserves, and so lead to convictions on
insufficient evidence. Furthermore, saddling a person forever
204
with his record might tend to discourage reformation.”

In Keith, the court concluded that the exclusion of pure propensity
205
evidence had “substantial validity.” The historical commitment of
Alaska courts to prohibit the introduction of pure propensity evidence supports a construction of the Alaska Due Process Clause
that condemns the admission of such evidence as a per se due process violation of article I, Section 7 of the Alaska Constitution.
Moreover, both of the interests that have persuaded the
Alaska Supreme Court to interpret the Alaska Due Process Clause
to more broadly protect the accused — constitutional validity and
reliability of factfinding — support the per se exclusion of propensity evidence. First, the foregoing discussion shows the constitutional infirmity of pure propensity provisions, because they mandate admission of the most unfairly prejudicial “bad man” evidence
while simultaneously disabling the procedural safeguards necessary
to afford due process. Second, because of the ease with which juries will overvalue pure propensity evidence and be inflamed into
deciding cases on emotion instead of the sufficiency of the evidence
of the offense charged, pure propensity evidence will greatly impair
accurate factfinding. Following Lauderdale, Gunderson, Thorne,
and Stephan, and in light of Fields, Oksoktaruk, Keith, and Lerchenstein, the Alaska Supreme Court should, and likely will, resolve the conflict between ARE 404’s propensity provisions and
204. Id. at 985 (quoting Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal Defendant—A Reevaluation of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evidence of Propensity to Commit Crime, 78 HARV. L. REV. 426, 436
(1964)) (footnotes omitted).
205. Id.
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the Alaska Due Process Clause against the admission of pure propensity evidence and in favor of fundamentally fair, accurate factfinding.
VII. CONCLUSION
Over thirty years ago, Chief Justice Warren emphasized the
genuine due process risks that inhere in the admission of othermisconduct evidence for propensity purposes. Although the
United States Supreme Court has yet to address this issue directly,
the Court’s ruling in Dowling v. United States certainly dovetails
with Chief Justice Warren’s understanding of the interaction between propensity evidence and due process. The Dowling Court
concluded that the admission of propensity evidence for nonpropensity purposes was permissible because procedural safeguards were available to protect the defendant’s due process rights.
The negative implication of Dowling—that propensity evidence
should not be admissible if procedural safeguards are unable to ensure fairness to the accused—should resonate through chambers
and courtrooms.
However, such evidence is presented for a propensity purpose
pursuant to Alaska’s recently enacted amendments to ARE 404,
and the Alaska Court of Appeals has found that the trial judge’s
ability to exclude the evidence through the procedural safeguard of
ARE 403 balancing is constitutionally dispositive. In theory and
practice, however, this is an empty protection, an illusion created
by simply renaming the unfairly prejudicial impact of pure propensity evidence as legitimate probative value. Trial courts cannot
meaningfully balance the probative value and the prejudicial effect
of pure propensity evidence, because both interests have now been
placed on the same side of the balance, by legislative fiat. There is
nothing left to balance. Given this simple reality, the court of appeals’ reliance upon ARE 403 as a constitutional “safeguard” is
alarming. The defendant’s constitutional rights to due process,
guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Alaska Constitution, can be preserved only if Alaska’s propensity provisions
are deemed unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court of Alaska is not likely to hesitate in declaring that the pure propensity provisions of ARE 404 are unconstitutional. The practical effect of such a decision is easy to predict.
Knowing that evidence of prior child abuse, sexual assault, violent
character, and domestic violence will no longer be admissible for
propensity purposes, prosecutors will petition courts to admit such
evidence for limited, permissible non-propensity purposes, under
ARE 404(b)(1). Some of this evidence will be admitted at trial,
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and some will fail a meaningful ARE 403 balance, and be excluded.
But even when the evidence is admitted at trial, it will be subject to
two additional safeguards—the limited use of the evidence and the
limiting jury instructions.
By resurrecting the three due process safeguards, which the
legislature effectively disabled when it enacted the propensity provisions, the Alaska Supreme Court can restore the constitutional
balance that has controlled the use of other-misconduct evidence
throughout our nation’s history, a balance originating in the English common law. It is a balance vital in a pluralistic society, in
which the case, not the character of the accused, is tried.

